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Abstract—Security is a key component for information tech-
nologies and communication. Security is a very large research
area involved in the whole information technology, related to
both hardware and software. This paper focuses on hardware
security, and more specifically on hardware cryptanalysis whose
aim is to extract confidential information (such as encryption
keys) from cryptographic circuits. Many physical cryptanalysis
techniques have been proposed in the last ten years but they
always belong to one of those very distinct categories: fault and
side channel attacks. In this article, a formal link between these
two categories is proposed. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first time that a wide class of attacks is described in such a
generic manner.
Keywords. Differential Power Analysis, Differen-
tial Fault Analysis, Differential Behavioral Anal-
ysis, Template Attacks, Fault Sensitivity Analysis,
AES128.
INTRODUCTION
Security is a key component for information technologies
and communication. Among the security threats, a very im-
portant one is certainly due to vulnerabilities of the inte-
grated circuits that implement cryptographic algorithms to
ensure confidentiality, authentication or data integrity (such
as smartcards). With the access to one of these circuits,
the attacker tries either to reconstruct the functionality of
the circuit (reverse engineering) or to recover cryptographic
materials when the cryptographic algorithm is known (phys-
ical or hardware cryptanalysis). Both threats share a set of
techniques. The first one, called side channel attacks, consists
in observing some physical characteristics which are modified
during the circuit’s computation. The second technique, called
fault attacks, consists in disrupting the circuit’s behavior.
The third one consists in getting information about the chip
design by direct inspection of its structure. This inspection
may be performed by using any kind of imaging techniques
or by using destructive means such as abrasion, chemical
etching or focused ion beam. Many protections have been
proposed to improve security against those types of attacks.
But every protection against physical cryptanalysis usually
lacks of genericity and is usually very specific to one precise
type of attack.
Even if physical cryptanalysis methods seem very different
at first sight, several works has been proposed to described
them with a commun formalism [MR03], [MOS09]. But these
works only cover side channel attacks. This paper describes
a formalism which is commun to both fault and side channel
attacks. The short-term aim of this work is to define “new”
attacks as new combinations of these concepts and algorithms.
Then, we plan to provide efficient and modular implementation
of these attacks. The long-term aim of this work is to merge
the advantages of attack-specific protections to enable a more
generic set of countermeasures.
In the first part of this article, we shortly describe side
channel and fault attacks and give an informal explanation
of the principles which are common in these two types of
attack. The cryptographic algorithm used as example, AES128
is also described. In the second part of the paper, we present
a small set of definitions and the algorithms we use to extract
information from physical attacks. Finally, we show that our
proposed formalism easily fits with several representative
examples.
I. SCOPE OF THE WORK
A. Physical cryptography
This paper deals with physical cryptanalysis of both soft-
ware or hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms
(such as AES128 described in I-C). These algorithms encrypt
a plaintext with a key to obtain a ciphertext. Physical crypt-
analysis is mainly based on the two following techniques:
1) Side channel: Side channel analysis exploits the fact
that some physical values or “side channels” (such as power
consumption, electromagnetic radiation or computation time)
of a circuit depend on the key value [Koc96], [KJJ99],
[SMP07]. A more rough technique consists in measuring
directly some key-related internal computations by using
micro-probing techniques. There are two subcategories of key
recovering techniques based on side channel measurements.
The first one, called DPA-like, consists in building a set of
mathematical models (i.e. mathematical formulæ) from a pri-
ori knowledge about the circuit. Each model is associated with
an hypothesis on the value of the key. Then, the models are
compared with measurements. The model which matches the
best with measurements is generally associated with the right
key hypothesis. The second kind of side channel attacks needs
a profiling step on another circuit. This circuit is supposed to
be identical to the target and the attacker is supposed to be
able to set the key value. In this case, the profiling step is
used either to improve the model a priori (stochastic attacks)
or to build a statistical model only based on measurements
(template attacks).
22) Faults: Fault attacks consist in disrupting the circuit’s
behavior. Their aim is to alter the correct progress of the
algorithm. Faults are injected into the device using various
means such as laser, clock glitches, spikes on the voltage sup-
ply or electromagnetic perturbations. A more rough technique
consists in modifying the circuit’s operation by modifying
internal computation through micro-probes, or even modify-
ing the circuit itself by using focused ion beam. There are
three subcategories of key recovering techniques that use the
results of faults attacks. Algorithm modifications consist either
in reducing the ciphering complexity of the cryptographic
algorithm [CT05] or in bypassing hardware or software pro-
tections. Differential Fault Attack (DFA), originally described
in [BDL97], [BS97] and in enhanced in [PQ03], [MSS06],
[Muk09], [TM09], [Gir05], [RLK11], consists in retrieving
the key by comparing the correct ciphertexts with faulty ones.
A detailed comparison of DFA schemes against AES, for
example, is given in [SLIO12]. To perform the third kind
of fault attacks, called safe-error attacks [YJ00], [RM07],
[LSG+10], the attacker does not necessarily need pairs of
correct and faulty ciphertexts but only some information about
the chip’s behavior.
B. Principle of the considered class of physical attacks
This paper does not deal yet with attacks which aim to
modify the algorithms (by using fault or circuit modifications).
It focuses on the different kinds of side channel attacks (DPA-
like, stochastic or template), DFA and safe-error attacks.
For such attacks, physical access to the circuit gives infor-
mation about the internal computations of the cryptographic
algorithm. Thanks to these pieces of information, the attacker
is able to apply a divide and conquer approach. Instead of
retrieving the whole key in one step (typically constituted of
one hundred to one thousand bits), the attacker performs the
same elementary attack step several times. Every elementary
attack enables him to retrieve a small part of the key, called
a partial key (typically 8 bits for AES128). At the end, the
attacker is able to rebuild the whole key. We claim that the
elementary steps of the attacks share the following method:
• Launch cryptographic operations on the target. Each
launch is called an experiment. Different kinds of ex-
perimental data such as power, electromagnetic emission
(EM), inputs or outputs, detailed in II-A, are recorded
during these experiments.
• Make sure that some of these measurements are related
to some others through the partial key. A more formal
definition of “relations” between measurements and the
key is provided in II-B.
• Build models that explain the relationship between these
measurements. These models are parametrized with one
value of partial key. These models are mathematical
formulæ determined either by a priori knowledge on the
chip or by using additional measurements. Examples of
models used for attacks are described precisely in II-C.
• Compare the models to the measurements, by using the
algorithms described in II-D. The best-fitted models with
the measurements are generally models associated with
the partial key.
To illustrate our formalism, we use as main example the AES
crypto-algorithm shortly described above.
C. Example of cryptographic algorithm : AES128
AES is a standard established by the NIST [NIS01] for
symmetric key cryptography. In this paper, we focus on the
128-bit-key version of the AES (represented in Figure 1). This
algorithm ciphers a 128-bit long data (called plaintext or input)
by using a 128-bit long key to obtain a 128-bit long data
(called ciphertext or output). The encryption consists first in
transforming the input data into a two-dimensional array of
bytes, called the state. Then, after a preliminary XOR between
the input and the key, AES128 executes 10 times a function
(called round) that operates on the state. The operations used
during these rounds are the following ones:
• SubBytes is a non-linear transform working indepen-
dently on individual bytes of the State. The result of this
operation at round i is noted round[i].s box
• ShiftRows is a rotation operation on each row of the
State. The result of this operation at round i is noted
round[i].s row
• MixColumns is a linear matrix multiplication working on
each column of the State. The result of this operation at
round i is noted round[i].m col
• AddRoundKey is a byte-wise XOR between the State and
a value k sch[i], computed from the key (according to
a transform called Key Expansion which is not detailed
in this paper). The result of this operation is the start of
the next round noted Round[i+ 1].start.
The rounds are identical, except for the last one in which the
Mixcolumns operation is skipped. At the end of the ciphering
operations, the state is copied to the output as depicted in
Figure 1.
AddRoundKey
SubBytes
ShiftRows
MixColumns
AddRoundKey
State Mi
M
(plaintext)
Round i
1..9
K0
Round 0
K1..K9
(round key 1..9)
SubBytes
AddRoundKey
Ciphertext C
K10
ShiftRowsRound 10
(round key 10)
(global key)
Fig. 1. AES128 encryption algorithm.
II. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Attacker’s environnement
1) Observable data: As explained above, physical attacks
are based on experiments, i.e. the launches of cryptographic
3operations on the target with or without modifying its behavior.
During these experiments, the attacker is able to directly
collect data such as digital values or analog ones. This set
of values are further called observable data, or observables.
Some observables, called stimuli, are used to launch the cryp-
tographic operations and generally change at each experiment:
plaintexts, whether there are perturbations or not, etc. Some
observables also define the experimental setup and generally
do not change during the experiments: kind of probes, gain
and bandwidth of the amplifier, oscilloscope type, key value,
etc. At last, some observables are the reactions or responses
of the circuit according to the stimuli and the experimental
setup. There are numerous reactions which can be recorded
by the attacker:
• the EM, power traces or the signal provided by a micro-
probe.
• the ciphertexts obtained without or with perturbations
(faulty ciphertexts).
• the behavior (i.e. the normal or abnormal working) of
the circuit in case of fault. This behavior may be deter-
mined, for example, by comparing the correct and faulty
ciphering, by detecting the start of an alarm or not, the
raise time of the alarm or by detecting a more or less
premature stop in computation.
• the computation time. One way to measure this compu-
tation time consists in reducing the clock period step by
step (on a specific clock cycle) and analyzing the circuit’s
behavior. The step in which the behavior of the circuit
switches from normal to abnormal is considered as an
indicator for the computation time. This particular step
is called “fault intensity” in [LSG+10].
Note that we also consider that any combination of observables
or any observable obtained by applying any signal processing
technique (filtering, temporal to frequency transformation,
etc.) is also considered as an observable.
2) Hidden data: At the opposite of observables, the execu-
tion of a cryptographic algorithm involves data that cannot be
directly measured by the attacker. This piece of data is called
hidden data or internal data in the following paragraphs.
3) “Border” between observables and hidden data: The
border between observables and hidden data depends on the
target and the attacker’s means (i.e. laboratory equipment
and threat scenario). In the following paragraphs, without
loss of generality, the hidden data are the internal variables
as defined in the standard (from round[1].start included to
round[10].s row and every variable computed in the key
schedule).
4) Dimension of observables: The measurements of ob-
servables may naturally be grouped in vectors or matrices of
several dimensions. The power consumption, recorded with an
oscilloscope, varies with the time. A power record (or trace)
is thus a set of measurements which is grouped in a vector
(dimension 1). An EM record, recorded with a EM probe
moving in a plan above the chip, is naturally grouped in a
3-dimension matrix (time and X-Y location of the probe). For
the sake of simplicity, we consider that a reaction is a scalar
value (its dimension is equal to zero).
B. Relationships between variables
As they are computed by or emanate from the same circuit,
hidden data and observables are physically related to each
others. These relationships can be described by a mathematical
expression (for example between the plaintext, the key and
the ciphertext in a nominal environment), some others cannot
(for example between the plaintext, the key and the power
consumption). But even if there is no mathematical expression
for these relationships, the authors in [MR03], [MOS09] have
introduced the notion of leakage function for side channel
attacks. These functions formalize the relationship between
some internal data (which are generally binary values) and
some analog signals (such as power, EM, etc.). To extend
this notion to fault attacks, we also consider “error leakage”
functions. These functions formalize the modification by a
fault of an internal data. As the internal data considered in
physical attacks are generally for AES 8-bit values, each
endomorphism of a set of 8 bits can be considered as a possible
error function.
An exploitable relationship is a relationship between ob-
servables. This kind of relationship can be used to perform an
attack by using a divide and conquer approach. Thus, such a
relationship needs to involve only a partial key. Note that a
relationship may be exploitable even without a mathematical
expression. Examples of widely used exploitable relationships
are reported in Table I. The relations only involves each byte of
the state but for clarity are written, in this Table, for the whole
state. In the following paragraphs, we note p = R(F, k,O)
the relation that links the reactions p and a set of observables
O according to the value k of the key and a set of leakage
functions F .
C. Relationship models
In the exploitable relationships described above, there is
at least one unknown value: the partial key (or guess). So,
the attacker has to create as many models as there distinct
values of the guess key (i.e. 256 possibilities for an 8-bit
guess key). For some relationships, other hidden data and one
or several leakage functions also have to be guessed. It is
impossible to test every possible leakage function because of
their tremendous (even infinite in the case of side channel
functions) number. The heuristics commonly used to choose
one leakage function or a set of leakage functions are based
on measurements or on a priori knowledge about the circuit
and the measurement setup. Only the last case which concerns
DPA-like, DFA and safe-error attacks, is described here. In
this case, the models are built on the following small set of
functions but other constructions are proposed for example in
[DPRS11].
1) Elementary functions: A byte B is a set of 8 bits noted
{b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1, b0}. The set with every bit set to one
(resp. zero) is noted 1 (resp. 0). We match it with B the
binary value Bb = b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0 but for the sake of
simplicity, B and Bb will be used indifferently. The decimal
value associated with B is noted Bd (for this conversion, b0
is the less significant bit).
4Num Observable Internal Relationship
R1 P=plaintext k sch[0] O = f(round[1].start)
O=micro-probing,EM, with round[1].start = SubBytes(AddRoundKey(P, k sch[0])
power, behavior
R2 P=plaintext k sch[0] O = f(round[1].start), INIT )
O=Power,EM INIT with round[1].start = SubBytes(AddRoundKey(P, k sch[0])
R3 C=ciphertext k sch[10] O = f(round[10].start)
O=Micro-probing,EM, with round[10].start = SubBytes−1(ShiftRow−1(AddRoundKey(C, k sch[10])))
power, behavior
R4 C=ciphertext k sch[10] O = AddRoundKey(ShiftRow(SubBytes(f(round[10].start))), k sch[10])
O=faulted ciphertext with round[10].start = SubBytes−1(ShiftRow−1(AddRoundKey(C, k sch[10])))
R5 C=ciphertext k sch[10] C′ = h(AddRoundKey(round[10].s row′, f(k sch[10])))
O=faulted ciphertext round[9].s row with :
or power round[10].s row′ = ShiftRow(SubBytes(AddRoundKey(k sch[9]′, round[9].s row)))
k sch[9]′ = g(AddRoundKey(round[10].start, round[9].s row))
round[10].start = SubBytes−1(ShiftRow−1(AddRoundKey(C, k sch[10])))
TABLE I
WIDELY USED RELATIONSHIPS
a) Bit level functions: The logical operations AND (sym-
bol &), OR (symbol |) and XOR (symbol ⊕) defined on a byte
are considered bitwise.
b) Weighted sum: Let B be a set of N bits and Ω be a
set of N integer, real or binary numbers. The function
∑
Ω is
the sum
∑
Ω
(B) = bN ∗ ωN + bN−1 ∗ ωN−1 + . . .+ b1 ∗ ω1 + b0 ∗ ω0
c) Select subset (or restriction) of bits: Let B (resp.
Ω) be a set of bits bi (resp. omegai). The set of bits bi
of B such that ωi of Ω is equal to “1”, is noted RΩ(B).
Example: if Ω = {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}, we have Ωd = 36 and
the restriction of B by R36 is the set of bits {b5, b2} of B.
Note that if B is constituted of N values, there are 2N − 1
possible restrictions. A restriction is said monobit when only
one bit of the byte is considered. So, the monobit restrictions
are R1, R2, R4, . . . , R128.
d) Subset of bits equal to: Let Ω and B be two sets of N
bits. Let M be the number of bits of the restriction of RΩ(B)
and α a set of M bits. We note RΩ(B) == α the function
that returns 1 when, for any bit i of RΩ(B) and α, we have
RΩ(B)i == αi and returns 0 otherwise.
2) Side channel functions: The simplest model proposed
for power consumption consists in considering the value of a
single bit. In this case, the leakage function is Ri with i ∈
{1, 2, 4, . . . , 128}. But more generally, side channel functions
are chosen as a combination of selections and weighted sums.
For example, the number of 1 values in a binary number B
is called Hamming weight and is noted HW (B) =
∑
1
(B).
A variation consists in considering the number of transitions
between two binary values. This function, called Hamming
distance, is noted HD(B,Ω) = HW (B ⊕ Ω).
3) Error functions:
a) Bit flip: A fault may invert a set of bits. The function
which models the bit flip is the bitwise XOR between B and
Ω with Ωd ∈ [1, . . . , 255]. When all the bits of the bitflip Ω are
equal to 1 (resp. 0), all the bits are inverted (resp. unchanged).
b) Set and reset: A fault may set a set of bits to
specific values. The function which models the reset (resp.
set) is the bitwise AND (resp. OR) between B and Ω with
Ωd ∈ [1, . . . , 255]. A reset with Ωd = 0 returns a set of 0. A
set with Ωd = 255 returns a set of 1.
c) Behavior: When a fault sets a set of bits RΩ(B) of B
to some value α, the circuit behavior is normal only when the
perturbed result is expected to be equal to α and is abnormal
otherwise. Such a behavior may be described by using the
function Ri(B) == α.
d) Setup time violation: When the faults are created by
violating the setup time of latches, these faults may impact
first the bytes which have the higher Hamming weight or may
impact first only one bit. In the first case, chip’s behavior may
be described by a Hamming weight and in the second case by
the function that selects one bit Ri with i ∈ {1, 2, 4, . . . , 128}.
D. Key retrieving algorithm
In this part, we explain how to deal with exploitable
relationships and measurements in order to discover a partial
key. The first input of the algorithm 1 is a relationship
between a set of observables and reactions. The models of
this relationship is parameterized by the set of all the possible
partial keys K and a set of models F . This set of models
formalizes the knowledge of the attacker about the circuit
and the measurement setup. Two cases arise: in the first
case, the attacker considers that one of these models is more
probable than the others but he doesn’t known which one is
the good one (case “dist(F)=one”). In the second case, he
considers that all the models are possible and are equiprobable
(case “dist(F)=several”). The second input of the algorithm
is the method to select the good or the bad key from a
comparison between the prediction and the measurements. The
different comparison methods are described in the algorithm
2. Roughly, when predictions and measurements are both
discrete variables and when the “noise” in the measurements is
considered negligible (it is typically the case for DFA), a sieve
algorithm can be used. But when taking noise into account
or when either predictions or measurements are continuous
variables, some statistical distinguishers are preferred (a count-
ing algorithm or a statistical similarity measurement). Mutual
information (MIA) [GBT07], Pearson correlation [BCO03],
distance of means (DoM) [KJJ99] or principal component
(PCA)[SNG+10] are possible examples of such statistical
similarity measurement tools.
Once these parameters are chosen, the measurements are
processed in an incremental way, i.e the attacker tries to
5recover this partial key with a reduced set of measurements.
If no partial key can be distinguished, then the attack is
performed with other measurements. He proceeds in this way
until the partial key is recovered.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to distinguish the key (and the model)
from the relationship R
Require: p = R(K,F,O) : A relationship with:
p : A reaction
k ∈ K = {k0, . . . , k2κ−1} : a set of 2κ partial keys
f ∈ F = {f1, . . . , fm} : a set of m leakage functions
o ∈ O = {o1, . . . , on} : a set of n observable
dist(F ) ∈ {one, several} the hypothesis on the distribution
of leakage functions
Max : Maximum number of measurements
sim ∈ {SIEV E,COUNT,CORR} : an algorithm that
computes a similarity
Ensure: k? : most “probable” key hypothesis
o : a matrix (size Max ∗ n) The observables
p : a vector (size Max) The reaction
Predp : a matrix (size 2κ ∗ m ∗Max) Prediction of the
reaction p
c : a vector (size 2κ)
Search← TRUE ; e← 0 ; k? ← NULL
while Search == TRUE and e < Max do
Perform the eth experiments
Store the corresponding measurements in o(e, 1 : n)
Store the corresponding reaction in p(e)
for i = 0 to 2κ − 1 do
for j = 1 to m do
Predp(i, j, e) = fj(ki, o(e, 1 : n))
end for
end for
for i = 0 to 2κ − 1 do
if dist(F)==one then
ct← 0
for j = 1 to m do
ct(j)← sim(p(1 : e), P redr(i, j, 1 : e))
end for
c(i)←MAX(ct(j))
else
c(i)← sim(p(1 : e), P redr(i, 1 : m, 1 : e))
end if
end for
if ∃α such that ∀β, c(α) >> c(β) then
k? ← ki
Search← FALSE
else
e← e+ 1
end if
end while
III. APPLICATIONS
In order to show that our formalism covers a wide class of
attacks, the relationships (described in II-B) and the parameters
for the algorithms (described in II-D) are reported in Table
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to compute the similarity
Require: : Meas a vector of measurements (size e)
Pred a matrix of measurements (size m ∗ e)
sim ∈ {SIEV E,COUNT,CORR} corr ∈
DoM,CPA,MIA, PCA, . . . statistical tool
Ensure: : c
switch sim
case :SIEV E
c← 1
for i = 1 to e do
l← 0
for j = 1 to m do
l← l | Pred(j, i) ==Meas(i)
end for
c← c&l
end for
end case
case :COUNT
c← 0
for i = 1 to e do
for j = 1 to m do
if Pred(j, i) ==Meas(i) then
c← c+ 1
end if
end for
end for
end case
case :CORR
index← 1
for i = 1 to e do
for j = 1 to m do
ePred(index)← Pred(j, i)
eMeas(index)←Meas(i)
index← index+ 1
end for
c← corr(ePred, eMeas)
end for
end case
end switch
II for different attacks proposed in the literature. A simple
but new attack is also proposed. It consists in probing the
signal on one wire of a 8-bit data bus where the outputs of
the Sboxes are supposed to pass through. Each leakage model
corresponds to one bit of these outputs. If the attacker is able to
temporally distinguish between the outputs of all the Sboxes,
every method described above used to compute the similarity
works. Otherwise, a method based on correlation is preferred.
The attack scheme shows that the attacker may retrieve every
bit of the key by probing only one single wire.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents a formalism which is common for a
wide class of physical attacks. It highlights that, despite their
differences in term of experimental setup, all these attacks
share the main underlying set of concepts and algorithms. This
paper also shows that this set is relatively small. It enable to
6Attack Relationship Leakage functions Similarity
and parameters and statistical
and probablitity tool
Probing R1 f(x) = RΩ(x) with All
P=Plaintext Ω ∈ {1, 2, 4, . . . , 128} All
O=Probe value and dist(F ) = one
DPA R3 f(x) = RΩ(x) with CORR with
[KJJ99] C=Ciphertext Ω ∈ {1, 2, 4, . . . , 128} DoM
O=Power and dist(F ) = one
CPA R2 f(x) = HW (x ⊕ Ω) with CORR with
[BCO03] P=Plaintext Ω ∈ [[1, 255]] Pearson
O=Power and dist(F ) = one
MIA R1 f(x) = HW (x) CORR with
[GBT07] P=Plaintext Mutual
O=Power Information
FSA R3 f(x) = HW (x) CORR with
[LSG+10] C=Ciphertext or Pearson
O=Intensity f(x) = RΩ(x) with
Ω ∈ {1, 2, 4, . . . , 128}
and dist(F ) = one
DBA R1 f(x) = (RΩ(x) == 0) with CORR with
[RM07] P=Plaintext Ω ∈ [[1, 255]] Pearson
O=Behavior and dist(F ) = one
DFA R4 f(x) = x⊕ Ω with SIEVE
[Gir05] C=Ciphertext Ω ∈ [[1, 255]]
O=Faulted and dist(F ) = several
Ciphertext
DFA R5 h(x) = x and COUNT
[RLK11] g(x,Ω) = x⊕ Ω with
C=Ciphertext Ω ∈ [[1, 255]]
O=Faulted and dist(G) = one
Ciphertext f(y,Γ) = y ⊕ Γ with
Γ ∈ [[1, 255]]
and dist(F ) = one
Combined R5 h(x) = HW (x) CORR with
[RLK11] C=Ciphertext f and g as Pearson
O=Power defined above
TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF THE FORMALISM
plan to define “new” attacks as new combinations of these
concepts and algorithms. It will also enable to provide efficient
and modular implementations of these attacks. Further works
will consist in including in the proposed formalism template
attacks, collision or algebraic attacks. Another future work will
consist in integrating in our scheme the higher-order attacks.
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